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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880612-CA 
v. : 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for theft, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from district courts 
in criminal cases not involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination so that his statements to police were 
properly admitted by the trial court. 
2. Whether the trial court was correct is denying 
defendant's motion for dismissal after a police officer testified 
regarding an oral statement made by defendant which was not 
disclosed to defense counsel prior to trial. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, the State relies on the 
following provisions: 
1. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978), 
2. U.S. Const, amends. V and VI, 
3. Utah R. Crim. P. 16, 
4. Utah R. Crim. P. 30. 
Copies of these provisions are attached in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 11, 1988, defendant was charged with theft, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1978) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 21-22). Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress his pre-charging statements and a hearing was 
held on that motion (R. at 26-28). After the hearing and further 
investigation by the court of proceedings in the circuit court, 
the motion was denied (R. at 30-36). 
This case was tried to a jury on August 11-12, 1988, in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding (R. at 39-41). 
After deliberation, the jury convicted defendant of theft, a 
class A misdemeanor, a lesser included offense of the original 
charge (R. at 90). On September 27, 1988, defendant was 
sentenced to a term of 12 months in the Salt Lake County Jail but 
the sentence was stayed and defendant placed on probation for a 
period of 18 months under certain conditions (R. at 111-12). 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on September 29, 1988 (R. at 
98). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant and the victim, Dale Mitchley, had been 
friends for ten to twelve years (R. 123 at 10-11). During the 
course of their friendshipf defendant had worked for Mitchley and 
even lived at his home for a period of time when he had needed a 
place to stay (R. 123 at 11-12 and 23). Mitchley is a long-haul 
trucker and allowed defendant to stay in his home to watch it and 
once hired defendant to drive a truck for him (R. 123 at 12 and 
24). 
In February of 1988, while Mitchley was driving his 
truck in the Midwest, he developed mechanical difficulties and 
called his neighbor, Ben Chapman, for assistance (R. 123 at 13). 
Mitchley asked Chapman to contact defendant and get his help in 
preparing an engine for transportation to Wisconsin to repair the 
truck Mitchley was driving (R. 123 at 13-14 and 51). Chapman 
contacted defendant and the two of them did the requested work 
(R. 123 at 51). 
A day or two after the work was done, Chapman went back 
to Mitchley's house and found the garage door ajar (R. 123 at 
51). Chapman checked and found an air compressor missing (R. 123 
at 51) and reported its loss to Mitchley (R. 123 at 15). 
Mitchley testified that he had not given anyone permission to 
take the compressor (R. 123 at 17). 
About one to two weeks after the theft was reported, 
Mitchley spoke by telephone with defendant and asked him if he 
knew anything about the compressor. Defendant answered that he 
did not (R. 123 at 20-21). Shortly before the preliminary 
hearing in this matter, defendant approached Mitchley on the 
street and told him that defendant had not taken the compressor 
but that he knew who had (R. 123 at 22). 
Around midnight on April 5-6, 1988, defendant was 
arrested when a burglar alarm sounded at Edison School (R. 122 at 
2-3). Detective Brent Hutchison interrogated defendant about 
that burglary in the early morning hours of April 6 (R. 122 at 
3). Defendant was fully advised of his right to counsel in the 
context of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
pursuant to the Miranda decision (R. 122 at 4). When defendant 
and Detective Hutchison had discussed the Edison School incident, 
the detective asked defendant if there were any other "crimes or 
situations he wanted to talk about, possibly get cleared up." (R. 
122 at 6). Defendant told Hutchison that he knew about a stolen 
compressor out of Murray, that Detective Christensen from Murray 
was working on the case, and that Dale Mitchley was the victim 
(R. 122 at 7 and 11). Defendant told Hutchison that another 
person had taken the compressor but that defendant would give 
information on the theft (R. 122 at 11). Defendant also said 
that he was willing to speak with Detective Christensen about the 
theft (R. 122 at 7) . 
On April 7, 1988, Detective Hutchison and Detective 
Christensen went to the jail and spoke with defendant (R. 122 at 
9 and 12 and R. 123 at 59). Detective Hutchison again advised 
defendant of his rights under the Miranda decision (R. 122 at 9 
and R. 123 at 59). As at the earlier interrogation, defendant 
said that he understood those rights and wished to speak with the 
officers (R. 122 at 5-6 and 9-10). Defendant never asked that 
questioning cease, nor did he ever indicate that he wanted 
counsel present (R. 122 at 10). During this second questioning, 
Detective Christensen explained that he was there at defendant's 
request and defendant admitted that he had taken the compressor 
(R. 123 at 59-60 and 100-101). Defendant said that he had sold 
or traded it to someone named Paul and eventually helped 
Detective Christensen locate the compressor and retrieve it. He 
also said that he had worked alone in stealing the compressor (R. 
123 at 60-65). At a later conversation between defendant and 
Christensen, defendant denied that he had taken the compressor 
(R. 123 at 63). On April 27th, defendant went to the Murray 
Police Station and told Detective Christensen where to find the 
compressor and then denied that he had taken it (R. 123 at 63). 
At that point, defendant claimed that Paul Larson was responsible 
for taking the compressor, but that he had helped plan the theft 
(R. 123 at 64). No written report of this April 27th 
conversation was made and the conversation was not reported to 
the prosecutor until the morning of trial (R. 123 at 68 and 77). 
Charges on the Edison School case were filed April 8, 
1988, and charges on the theft of the air compressor were filed 
on April 13, 1988 (R. 122 at 8 and 13 and R. at 34). There was 
some confusion about when counsel was appointed for defendant. 
When defense counsel questioned Detective Hutchison at the 
suppression hearing, he spoke of the second interrogation which 
occurred on April 7. He asked the detective, "Sometime prior to 
engaging in these discussions to talking about the crimes, he 
[defendant] indicated to you that he had been to court; isn't 
that true?" To this, the detective answered, MI believe so." (R. 
122 at 4). Detective Hutchison continued to answer defense 
counsel's leading questions as if counsel had been appointed 
prior to the questioning on April 7th (R. 122 at 5). Detective 
Christensen was not called to testify at the suppression hearing 
but did testify at trial concerning that second questioning. 
Detective Christensen said that he was present during the time 
Detective Hutchison gave defendant his Miranda warnings and that 
defendant had not said anything about counsel having been 
appointed in Christensen's presence (R. 123 at 66). Neither had 
Detective Hutchison ever told him that defendant had said that 
counsel might have been appointed; the first time Christensen 
heard that defendant may have made that statement was at the 
suppression hearing (R. 123 at 66). 
A jailor who was present at the suppression hearing 
testified as to the procedures followed for persons, such as 
defendant, who were in custody but not formally charged (R. 122 
at 20-31). Evidently, a first appearance or probable cause 
hearing is held as soon as possible after arrest to allow a 
magistrate to set bail or conditions of release (R. 122 at 20). 
Counsel is not usually appointed at this hearing but may be 
appointed at a later hearing, after formal charges are filed (R. 
122 at 23-25). The jailor testified that different judges may 
have a different procedure regarding whether counsel is appointed 
at that probable cause hearing, but that Judge Gowans (who 
evidently conducted the probable cause hearing for defendant) 
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does not appoint counsel at that initial hearing (R. 122 at 30-31 
and 37). 
Based on the testimony introduced at the suppression 
hearing, Judge Russon asked counsel to provide a transcript of 
the probable cause hearing and the file from the Edison School 
burglary case to him for a determination as to whether counsel 
was appointed at the initial hearing (R. 122 at 37-38). After 
reviewing the file, Judge Russon found: 
A review of State v. Christofferson, CR-
88-652, the school burglary case, the Court 
file indicates that the Complaint was filed 
on April 8, 1988, and a Summons dated that 
date of the warrant of arrest. The defendant 
appeared without counsel for arraignment in 
Circuit Curt [sic] on April 11, 1988, at 
which time the court appointed the Legal 
Defenders office to represent the defendant. 
The Court recognizes that the detective 
who interrogated the defendant testified that 
on April 7, the defendant informed him he had 
been to court and an attorney had been 
appointed who he had not yet seen. This 
could not have possibly happened, since the 
court records indicate clearly that neither 
case was filed at the time of or prior to 
April 7, and the defendant made no court 
appearance according to the files until April 
11. The Court in this decision relies upon 
the accuracy of the official court files. 
(R. at 34-35) (emphasis in original). 
Defendant took the stand at trial and testified that he 
had taken the compressor but that he felt Mitchley owed him money 
and therefore he was justified in taking it (R. 123 at 84-85). 
He had never informed other witnesses of this claim until trial 
(R. 123 at 22-23, 49, and 60-61). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since formal charges had not yet been filed against 
defendant at the time of the April 7 interrogation, a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached. Defendant's 
right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and 
its attendant right to counsel under Miranda, was implicated 
because defendant was in custody. Defendant was fully advised of 
his Miranda rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right 
to have counsel present during questioning. The trial court 
found that a hearing at which counsel could have been appointed 
never occurred prior to the April 7 interrogation, and this 
finding is not clearly erroneous. If the hearing did occur, 
defendant's mere presence would not have been an invocation of 
the right to have counsel present at subsequent questioning, and 
there is nothing in the record to support a finding that 
defendant asked for counsel at such a pre-interrogation hearing. 
There is no evidence that defendant ever expressly 
invoked his right to have counsel present and his statement that 
counsel may have been appointed was not an equivocal invocation 
of that right. Even if defendant's statement is construed as an 
equivocal invocation, the statement was made before the Miranda 
admonition was given and that admonition served as a stronger 
clarification than any other questions could have. The statement 
was not coerced and was properly admitted as voluntary. 
Defendant waived any right to appeal the issue of an 
alleged discovery violation when he failed to object to the 
introduction of defendant's April 27 oral statement. Neither did 
defendant seek a just and appropriate remedy when he asked for a 
dismissal of the charges as a remedy for the alleged violation. 
Even if the nondisclosure of the April 27 statement 
were a discovery violation, it was harmless error. Given all of 
the defendant's statements to the victim and to the detectives, 
that oral statement was not credible and disclosure of the 
statement before trial would not have changed the outcome of 
trial. Defendant has not made a credible argument that 
nondisclosure impaired his defense and has not shown a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result at trial had disclosure of that 
statement occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AT THE TIME OF DEFENDANT'S INTERROGATION, HIS 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL HAD NOT 
ATTACHED. DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND HIS 
CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have 
suppressed his statement of April 7 because he had not waived his 
right to have counsel present when the statement was given. In 
making that argument, he does not appear to dispute the trial 
court's conclusion that, because formal charges on either case 
had not been filed as of April 7, the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had not yet attached. In line with this apparent 
concession, defendant offers no Sixth Amendment analysis of the 
suppression issue. Rather, he focuses on the questions of 
whether, at the time the statement was elicited by the police, he 
had invoked or waived his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel 
present during custodial interrogation. Accordingly, the State 
will limit its response to an analysis of those issues under the 
Fifth Amendment, recognizing that reference to the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is neither pertinent nor necessary to 
their resolution. 
A. Standard of Review for Trial Court's Decision 
Regarding Suppression of Evidence. 
Utah appellate courts have delineated a "clearly 
erroneous" standard when reviewing the decisions of trial courts 
on motions to suppress evidence. This Court, in State v. 
Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988), said: 
When reviewing a trial court's factual 
assessments underlying a decision to grant or 
deny a suppression motion, this Court will 
not disturb the court's determination unless 
the trial court was clearly in error. State 
v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). A trial 
court's determination is clearly erroneous 
if, upon review of the totality of the facts 
and circumstances, we reach a firm and 
definite conviction that a mistake has been 
made. ^d. at 1258; State v. Hegelman, 717 
P.2d 1348 (Utah 1986). 
754 P.2d at 968. This Court, then, should affirm defendant's 
conviction because the trial court's factual determinations in 
this matter were correct. As will be set out below, the totality 
of the circumstances demonstrates that the trial court did not 
err in its decision to admit defendant's admissions at trial. 
B. Defendant Did Not Expressly Invoke His Right to 
Have Counsel Present During Interrogation. 
Defendant first claims that he invoked his right to 
counsel when he appeared at a probable cause hearing. He admits 
that the trial court found that this hearing could not have 
occurred but states that this finding is clearly erroneous. He 
_i n_ 
asserts that, "The Edison School file, relied upon by the judge, 
may well not have been created until charges were filed on April 
8. Probable cause hearings, although routinely held the day 
after arrest, may not be noted in files." (Br. of App. at 11). 
There is nothing in the record to support this assertion and 
defendant's request that this Court accept this statement as fact 
without record support is contrary to the standards of appellate 
review. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986). 
Contrary to defendant's recitation of the testimony, 
the officers did not testify that they "had the impression Mr. 
Christofferson appeared in court and a lawyer was appointed; . . 
." (Br. of App. at 11). Only one detective testified and his 
testimony was that defendant told him that he [defendant] thought 
that counsel had been appointed (R. 122 at 14). Nor did the 
transportation officer testify that "he would have taken the 
defendant to court the day after his arrest." (Br. of App. at 
11). Officer Probert testified that the normal procedure was to 
take arrested individuals before the magistrate the next morning 
for a probable cause hearing and setting of bond (R. 122 at 20). 
The officer specifically said that he had no idea if he was 
present on April 6 when defendant might have been taken before 
the magistrate (R. 122 at 28-29). Not knowing if he was present 
on April 6, he did not know whether defendant was appointed 
counsel on that day (R. 122 at 29). 
With that information before it, the trial court took 
the suppression motion under advisement until further information 
about the possibility of a probable cause hearing could be 
presented (R. 122 at 33-42). The court requested a transcript of 
any probable cause hearing held for defendant and the court file 
for the school burglary case. After receiving the court file, 
but without receiving a transcript, the court entered its ruling 
(R. at 30-36). The court acknowledged the testimony of Detective 
Hutchison that defendant had said that he had been to court and 
that an attorney had been appointed (R. at 31 and 35). The court 
ruled, however, that an actual court appearance prior to the 
questioning on April 7 could not have happened. The court said: 
The Court recognizes that the detective who 
interrogated the defendant testified that on 
April 7, the defendant informed him he had 
been to court and an attorney had been 
appointed who he had not yet seen. This 
could not have possibly happened, since the 
court records indicate clearly that neither 
case was filed at the time of or prior to 
April 7, and the defendant made no court 
appearance according to the files until 
April 11. The Court in this decision relies 
upon the accuracy of the official court 
files. 
(R. at 35). The court thus found from official court records 
that the probable cause hearing was not held prior to 
interrogation on April 7. 
For this Court to determine that the probable cause 
hearing was held prior to April 7, it must find that the trial 
court's finding was clearly erroneous. State v. Griffin, 754 
P.2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 1988). Nothing in the record indicates 
that the finding was erroneous. There is no proof that the 
hearing was held; there is only Detective Hutchison's testimony 
that he believed that defendant said that he had been to court. 
Even that statement is not sufficient to negate the official file 
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in the school burglary case and support a decision that the trial 
court's opposite finding is clearly erroneous. 
If this Court were to find that the trial court erred 
and the hearing had occurred, the issue becomes whether defendant 
asked for counsel at that hearing. The record is silent as to 
whether defendant actually asked for counsel. As the trial court 
stated in its ruling: 
If, in fact, the hearing had occurred prior 
to April 7, whether or not Christofferson 
invoked his Sixth Amendment rights would 
depend upon what was said at the hearing. If 
the defendant had stated that he did not have 
an attorney and requested that one be 
appointed, that would constitute an 
invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. If the defendant made no request 
for counsel, and the Court noting he did not 
have one simply appointed the Legal Defenders 
Office to represent him that, in this Court's 
view, would not constitute an invocation of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
(R. at 35-36). The record in this case is simply insufficient to 
determine whether defendant asked for counsel at a probable cause 
hearing. Defendant never testified as to whether he asked for 
counsel, and none of the other witnesses were present at a pre-
statement probable cause hearing, nor were they able to testify 
about a counsel request. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 
1986). 
Defendant appears to assert that his mere appearance at 
a probable cause hearing was an invocation of his right to have 
counsel present at custodial interrogation (Br. of App. at 11, 
n. 1 and 13). There is nothing in the record to support this 
assertion. The cases which defendant cites for this proposition 
do not support a ruling that mere appearance is an invocation. 
Edwards v. Arizona/ 451 U.S. 477 (1981), involved a request for 
counsel made directly to police officers while defendant was in 
custody but before he was taken before a magistrate. Again, in 
Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S.Ct. 2093 (1988), no mention was made 
of whether defendant had been to court and requested counsel 
because the counsel request had been made directly to the 
officers. The court in Cervi v. Kemp, 855 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 
1988) cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 1172, made it clear that the record 
below had demonstrated that the defendant had been asked at 
arraignment if he wanted counsel and he had said yes. Both 
United States ex. rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th 
Cir. 1987) cert, denied, 483 U.S. 1010, and Michigan v. Jackson, 
475 U.S. 625 (1986), involved cases in which the record clearly 
demonstrated that the defendants had been arraigned and requested 
counsel. Finally, Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987), 
was another situation in which the request for counsel was made 
directly to the police prior to arraignment. None of these cases 
fit the present case wherein the record is clear that defendant 
had not been arraigned prior to the April 7 interrogation and 
there is no record that defendant asked for counsel at a probable 
cause hearing. 
C. Defendant Waived His Right to Have Counsel Present 
During Questioning. 
Accepting the trial court's ruling that the probable 
cause hearing did not occur prior to April 7, the issue becomes 
whether defendant either invoked or waived his right to have 
counsel present during questioning on April 7. Such an 
invocation would rest on defendant's Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination and could be waived after proper 
Miranda admonition. That right to the presence of counsel was 
validly waived as the trial court found after the suppression 
hearing (R. at 35)• 
On April 7, defendant was interrogated about his 
involvement in the compressor theft. At the suppression hearing, 
Detective Hutchison testified that defendant said that he thought 
counsel had been appointed for him. Accepting, as it appears the 
trial court did, that the statement was made, it did not 
constitute an unequivocal invocation of his right to have counsel 
present during questioning. At most, it would have been an 
equivocal invocation of counsel, a point which will be addressed 
below. 
Assuming, at this point, for the sake of argument that 
defendant's statement was an equivocal invocation, State v. 
Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988), allows an officer to 
clarify that equivocation. To address the question of whether 
this "equivocal" invocation was clarified, it is important to 
look to the record. Contrary to the assertions of defendant in 
his brief (Br. of App. at 14), the record does not demonstrate 
that the Miranda warnings were given and then defendant made his 
statement about the appointment of counsel. In fact, the record 
demonstrates exactly the opposite. The statement was made at a 
time when Detective Christensen was not in the room (T. 123 at 
66). In response to cross-examination at trial, Christensen said 
that defendant did not say anything about having counsel while 
Christensen was there. Neither did Hutchison tell Christensen 
about any mention of counsel until Hutchison testified to that 
effect at the suppression hearing (R. 123 at 66). The statement 
was made before Christensen entered the room and before defendant 
was given the Miranda warnings. Christensen testified that he 
did not personally give the admonitions to defendant but that he 
was present when Hutchison gave them (R. 123 at 59). Defendant 
does not claim that he was not given the warnings. When 
defendant was advised of his right to have counsel present, "[h]e 
indicated he would talk to me [Christensen] at that time without 
an attorney present." (R. 123 at 59). If defendant equivocally 
invoked his right to have counsel present before Christensen 
entered the room (the only time he could have done it), that 
invocation was clarified and waived when defendant was given the 
Miranda admonitions and told the detectives he would talk to them 
without an attorney present. Because of a sparse record, it is 
unknown whether Hutchison asked defendant any other clarifying 
questions. 
This is different from the case of State v. Griffin, 
754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988). In Griffin, the defendant was 
advised of the Miranda rights, which he waived. He then was 
questioned and, during the interview, said, "This is a lie. I'm 
calling an attorney." 754 P.2d at 966. The detective in that 
case then clarified that statement and Griffin said that he did 
not want counsel at that point but would continue talking. 754 
P.2d at 966-67. This Court held that the clarification was 
appropriate and the statement was not taken in violation of 
Griffin's right to have counsel present (but reversed when it 
found that the statement was coerced). 754 P.2d at 969-71. 
In the present case, the equivocal invocation of right 
to have counsel present occurred before the Miranda warnings were 
given. The warnings themselves are a stronger clarification than 
if the detectives had asked what he meant. By admonishing him 
completely about his right to have counsel present, then asking 
if he understood those rights and was willing to speak, the 
detectives clarified any ambiguity about defendant's 
"invocation". As the trial court found, defendant was fully 
advised of his right to have counsel present and waived that 
right knowingly and intelligently and without coercion. He never 
invoked the right even equivocally after being admonished (R. 123 
at 59 and R. 122 at 9-10). 
D. Defendant's Statement That He Thought Counsel May 
Have Been Appointed Was Not An Invocation of His Right 
To Have Counsel Present. 
Defendant claims that his statement to the officer that 
he thought counsel may have been appointed was an equivocal 
invocation of the right to have counsel present during 
questioning. This statement was not even an equivocal invocation 
of the right which required clarification. 
The law is clear that an equivocal request requires 
clarification or interpretation; however, if the mention of 
counsel is not even an equivocal request, no invocation has 
occurred. The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
an equivocal request in Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 
(1987). That case involved a pre-arraignment questioning of a 
suspect in a sexual assault. During custodial interrogation, 
Barrett was advised three times of the Miranda warnings prior to 
three different interrogations. Each time, he expressed a 
willingness to talk and to answer questions but refused to sign 
any written statement without the presence of counsel. The 
Connecticut Supreme Court reversed Barrett's conviction, holding 
that "Barrett's expressed desire for counsel before making a 
written statement served as an invocation of the right for all 
purposes: . . . ". 479 U.S. at 526. The United States Supreme 
Court reversed the Connecticut court, holding that Barrett had 
made clear his willingness to talk about the assault and had 
limited his invocation of right to counsel to the making of 
written statements. The Court said: 
We do not denigrate the "settled approach to 
questions of waiver [that] requires us to 
give a broad, rather than a narrow, 
interpretation to a defendant's request for 
counsel," Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 
633 (1986), when we observe that this 
approach does little to aid respondent's 
cause. Interpretation is only required where 
the defendant's words, understood as ordinary 
people would understand them, are ambiguous. 
Here, however, Barrett made clear his 
intentions, and they were honored by police. 
To conclude that respondent invoked his right 
to counsel for all purposes requires not a 
broad interpretation of an ambiguous 
statement, but a disregard of the ordinary 
meaning of respondent's statement. 
479 U.S. at 529-30 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
In a case somewhat analogous to the present one, a 
federal circuit court held that showing his attorney's card to 
detectives and telling them that he had been told not to make a 
statement was not an invocation of the right to have counsel 
present. Quadrini v. Clusen, 864 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1989), 
involved a defendant who had a bail hearing on May 19, then 
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formal charges were filed the same day and he was arraigned the 
next day. Following the bail hearing, Quadrini was taken to an 
office in the sheriff's department. Quadrini was advised of his 
Miranda admonitions and said that he understood them. He 
-specifically replied that he did not want an attorney present 
despite the fact that after his court appearance earlier that day 
he had been told by an investigator from the public defender's 
office that he should not make a statement." 864 F.2d at 579. 
Quadrini made incriminating statements to the first officer. 
Later in the evening, a second officer entered the 
office and was told of the statements. After the second officer 
arrived, Quadrini pulled the business cards of the public 
defender and the investigator from his pocket and put them on the 
table in front of the officers. There was no discussion about 
the cards but the second officer was told that Quadrini had been 
told not to make a statement. Further questioning occurred and 
Quadrini gave a full statement which was admitted at trial. 
On appeal, Quadrini claimed that showing the business 
card of the public defender and telling the officer's that he had 
been advised not to make a statement were an invocation of his 
right to have counsel present. The state courts ruled that this 
was insufficient to invoke the right. "Moreover, both reviewing 
courts found that in addition to informing Norlander and Andrekus 
of the investigator's advice, Quadrini unequivocally and in clear 
and unambiguous terms stated that he did not want an attorney 
present." 864 F.2d at 582 (footnote omitted). The Seventh 
Circuit Court reviewed the state court rulings and upheld the 
conviction. The circuit court agreed that Quadrini's actions and 
statements were not an invocation and agreed that his statements 
were not coerced and were admissible. 
In the present case, defendant's statement that he 
thought counsel had been appointed was not an ambiguous statement 
that should be construed as a request for counsel. Taking 
defendant's words, "understood as ordinary people would 
understand them", 479 U.S. at 523, they are nothing more than a 
statement of belief that counsel may have been appointed. There 
is no implication that they include a request that that counsel 
be present before questioning. They are similar to Quadrini 
pulling out the public defender's card. Quadrini's statement 
that an investigator for the public defender had said not to make 
a statement is closer to an expression that counsel is requested 
that is defendant's statement in the present case. Just as in 
Quadrini and Barrett, this Court should find that there was no 
express or equivocal request for counsel in this case. 
A review of the case law cited by defendant 
demonstrates that those cases do involve equivocal invocations 
but that they are distinguishable from the statement by defendant 
in the present case. In Griffin, the defendant said "This is a 
lie. I'm going to talk to an attorney." 754 P.2d at 968. In 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), the Supreme Court found 
that Smith had clearly asserted the right by saying "Yeah, I'd 
like an attorney present," but then equivocated when the officer 
continued questioning. The express assertion triggered Miranda 
and further questioning which lead to the equivocation was 
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impermissible. In State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074 
(Idaho App. 1983), defendant said, "Maybe I need an attorney0 or 
"I think I need an attorney." In Thompson v. Wainright, 601 F.2d 
768 (5th Cir. 1979), Thompson said that he wanted to tell an 
attorney first. In State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 1265 
(1984), Wright said, "I won't sign any more deeds [or waivers] 
without a lawyer present." Other examples are contained in pages 
15 and 16 of defendant's brief. All of these cases show an 
equivocal invocation but all demonstrate some kind of statement 
that the defendants felt that they may have wanted counsel 
present. All of them occurred during or after the giving of the 
admonition and required some kind of clarification. 
Defendant's statement, on the other hand, did not say 
anything that could be construed to mean that he felt he may have 
wanted counsel present. It was merely a statement of belief that 
counsel may have been appointed. 
POINT II 
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE ORAL STATEMENT GIVEN 
BY DEFENDANT TO DETECTIVE CHRISTENSEN WAS NOT 
A DISCOVERY VIOLATION REQUIRING DISMISSAL. 
Defendant next complains that the prosecution did not 
disclose to him a statement which he made to Detective 
Christensen on April 27, 1988. On April 7, defendant had told 
Christensen that he, defendant, had taken the compressor. He 
told Christensen that he had sold it to a person named Paul but 
could not remember Paul's last name (R. 123 at 60). Defendant 
said that he had taken the compressor by himself at the request 
of Paul and had traded the compressor to Paul for drugs (R. 123 
at 61-62). He also gave the address where the compressor was 
supposed to be and a source to use in locating Paul's last name 
(R. 123 at 62). Using that information, Christensen was able to 
arrive at the name of Paul Larson as the one who received the 
compressor, but was unable at that point to find and retrieve the 
compressor (R. 123 at 62-63). 
Nearly three weeks later, on April 27, defendant went 
to the Murray Police Station and asked to talk to Detective 
Christensen (R. 123 at 62-63). Defendant told Christensen that 
defendant had just come from the Mitchley residence and knew that 
the compressor had not been recovered (R. 123 at 63). Defendant 
gave further information which allowed Christensen to recover the 
compressor at the address originally given by defendant but in a 
different unit (R. 123 at 64-65). Defendant then denied that he 
had taken the property from Mitchley and said that Larson was 
responsible for the theft (R. 123 at 63). When questioned about 
his earlier confession that he had taken the compressor, 
defendant 
[by Detective Christensen] indicated they had 
been, you know, he and Mr. Larson had planned 
this together. They had been together in 
doing this. He went with him at the time, 
but he didn't go with him at the time when 
the actual theft occurred. 
Q When you say, "he" — 
A Mr. Christofferson had told me that he 
had told Mr. Larson how to obtain the item, 
but he had not gone with him at the time he 
obtained it. 
(R. 123 at 64). The information about this subsequent 
conversation was not in any police report and thus was not given 
to defense counsel in the process of discovery (R. 123 at 67-68). 
At the close of defense counsel's cross examination of 
Detective Christensen, a recess was taken (R. 123 at 70). At the 
conclusion of that recess, counsel and defendant met with the 
judge without the jury present (R. 123 at 70). At that time, 
defense counsel moved to dismiss based on what he claimed was a 
failure by the State to provide exculpatory evidence. Defendant 
argued that his April 27 statement was a retraction of his 
earlier statement and thus was exculpatory (R. 123 at 77). The 
trial court denied the motion, stating: 
Apparently, this was information that was not 
contained in any of the investigative reports 
or in the mind of the prosecutor, he himself, 
did not know about it until today. 
Apparently, this was some information that 
came out during examination of the officer. 
(R. 123 at 78). 
To analyze this issue, the following recitation of 
facts may be helpful. When defendant took the stand he testified 
that he had not told Detective Christensen that he hadn't taken 
the compressor. On direct examination, defendant said: 
Q [by Mr. Bradshaw] What did you tell 
them [the police]? 
A [by defendant] I went and talked to 
Det. Christensen and when I went in there I 
started talking to him, and I said something 
to the effect of Paul Larson, the guy who had 
it, and I said something to the effect that 
he had something to do with it. And Mr. 
Christensen asked me if I was saying I didn't 
do it or if I was changing, you know my plea 
or whatever. I told him, "No, I am not 
saying I didn't do it." 
Q What were you saying? 
A Well, I told him that I knew where it 
was at. That is the point I was trying to 
get across to him. I knew where he could get 
the stuff back. 
(R. 123 at 87). On cross examination, defendant testified: 
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Q [by Mr. Walsh] You have heard Det. 
Christensen today tell us that you told him 
the second time you met with him out at the 
Murray Police Department, that you had not 
done it but you knew who did? 
A [by defendant] Not in them [sic] exact 
words. 
Q What are the exact words, sir? 
A I remember discussing with him. What I 
most remember is he asked me — he asked me, 
"Exactly now, are you telling me that you 
didn't do it?" I said, "No, that is not what 
I am telling you." 
Q That is not what he testified to here 
today, was it? 
A No. He said I said I didn't do it, and 
I don't think that is exactly what was said, 
no. 
Q Did you ever tell Det. Hutchison of the 
Salt Lake Police Department that, in fact, 
you had not stolen the compressor but that 
you knew who did? 
As [sic] I told him I knew about it. I 
can't remember telling him that I didn't do 
it. You know, specifically in them [sic] 
words. 
Q So, you don't remember whether you told 
him [Detective Hutchison] that or not? 
A No, not in so many words. I told him I 
knew of it. When he asked me if I knew of 
any other crimes, I told him that I knew of a 
compressor that was missing in Murray. I 
can't remember if I told him I didn't do it. 
I told him I knew of it and possibly knew who 
done [sic] it. 
Q Were you playing games with him, sir? 
A I might have been, yeah. 
Q You tell us you might. Were you or 
weren't you? 
A No, I don't think I was playing games 
with him but I didn't want to incriminate 
myself right there. 
(R. 123 at 93-94). 
Defendant had also spoken with the victim about the 
theft of the compressor and given statements conflicting with 
other statements given to the detectives. Approximately two 
weeks after the compressor was reported missing on February 24, 
1988/ defendant spoke with Mitchley by phone and told Mitchley 
that he had had nothing to do with the compressor being taken (R. 
123 at 21). Again, just a few days before the preliminary 
hearing was held, defendant approached Mitchley outside of his 
home and said that he had not taken the compressor (R. 123 at 
22). Mitchley testified that, at that meeting just before the 
preliminary hearing, Mitchley was not aware that defendant had 
confessed to taking the compressor and didn't discuss that with 
defendant. He also testified that he did not tell defendant that 
some neighbors had seen defendant take the compressor (R. 123 at 
32). 
Defendant testified differently, saying that he had not 
denied taking the compressor when he spoke with Mitchley by 
phone, but had only said that he would talk to him about it when 
defendant got back to Utah (R. 123 at 86). Defendant said that, 
at the face to face meeting, Mitchley told him that neighbors had 
seen defendant take the compressor. Defendant also said that he 
admitted to Mitchley at that meeting that he had committed the 
theft (R. 123 at 86). 
This information is given in detail as background for 
the issues of whether defendant has waived this claim on appeal, 
whether a discovery violation did occur and whether, if it did, 
it was harmless error. 
A. Defendant Has Waived This Issue on Appeal. 
It became clear during trial that defendant had 
approached Detective Christensen and given him an oral statement 
about which no police report was made (R. 123 at 68). This 
testimony came from Detective Christensen on the afternoon of the 
first day of trial when he was called as the third witness. 
After his testimony, the court recessed and defense counsel 
eventually raised the discovery issue during that recess (R. 123 
at 77). Defense counsel complained that he had not been informed 
about this oral statement before the testimony of Christensen (R. 
123 at 77). The prosecutor stated that he had first been made 
aware of the statement that morning just before trial commenced 
(R. 123 at 78). 
Defense counsel did not ask for a continuance or a 
mistrial for purposes of preparing to respond to this testimony 
of the oral statement. Counsel only asked for a dismissal of the 
charge (R. 123 at 77). The prosecutor responded that he had just 
learned about the statement that day himself and argued that the 
fact that defendant had given inconsistent statements about his 
involvement in the case was well known to defense counsel. The 
prosecution objected that dismissal was too strong a remedy if, 
indeed, a discovery violation had occurred (R. 123 at 78). 
Defendant did not modify his request but merely submitted it on 
his motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion, 
stating that it was information not found in any investigative 
report and was material made known to the prosecutor only that 
first day of trial (R. 123 at 78-79). 
By clinging to his motion to dismiss as remedy for an 
alleged discovery violation and by failing to object to the 
testimony about the oral statement when it was offered, defendant 
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has waived his right to appeal this issue. Rule 16(g) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention of 
the court that a party has failed to comply 
with this rule, the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems 
just under the circumstances. 
At the juncture at which the information became known, defendant 
could have asked for, and the court could have granted, such 
relief as was "just under the circumstances." Defendant could 
have mitigated the effect of the testimony by objecting to it 
when it was first proffered by Detective Christensen and he 
became aware that the statement had not been previously disclosed 
to him. In the alternative, he could have sought a continuance 
to allow time for preparation to use the information Detective 
Christensen had disclosed or could have asked that it be stricken 
from the record or asked for a mistrial. Counsel did not object 
to its introduction nor seek a continuance to prepare to rebut 
the testimony nor ask for a mistrial. By asking only for 
dismissal, which would not have been just under the 
circumstances, and not raising a timely objection, he has waived 
relief under Rule 16(g). See State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 
882-83 (Utah 1988). 
B. If a Discovery Violation Did Occur, the Error Was 
Harmless. 
If this Court does not find that defendant has waived 
the discovery issue on appeal, it should find that the error, if 
any, was harmless. Defendant argues that his conviction should 
be reversed because he was significantly prejudiced when the 
trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Even if a violation 
occurred, defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced 
thereby. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion to dismiss "depends entirely upon a 
determination of whether the prosecutor's failure to produce the 
requested information resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant 
reversal under [Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a), Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
30(a) (1982) ]," the harmless error rule. State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) . 
In Knight, the Court thoroughly analyzed the operation 
of Rule 30(a) in the context of a discovery violation by the 
prosecution (wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence). 
It clarified the meaning of its previous interpretations of Rule 
30(a) that "an error warrants reversal 'only if a review of the 
record persuades the court that without the error there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant, '" by holding that "[f]or an error to require 
reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." 735 
P.2d at 919-20 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis in 
original). Under Knight, 
when the defendant can make a credible 
argument that the prosecutor's errors have 
impaired the defense, it is up to the State 
to persuade the court that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that absent the error, 
the outcome of trial would have been more 
favorable for the defendant. 
734 P.2d at 921. The State "can meet this burden by showing that 
despite the errors, the outcome of trial merits confidence and 
there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for 
defendant." 734 P.2d at 921. 
The first prong of analysis of Rule 30 under Knight is 
whether defendant has made a credible argument that the error has 
impaired the defense. On this point, defendant claims that his 
defense was greatly impaired by surprise 
testimony that Mr. Christofferson had, 
according to the police, given a 
substantially different statement to the 
investigating officer during the course of 
the investigation. Mr. Christofferson was 
unable to fashion an overall strategy in 
coping with the double attack of a damaging 
statement and a belatedly revealed retraction 
of that statement. His lawyer was also 
unable to adequately prepare to cross-examine 
the officer, whose testimony undoubtedly 
carried a great deal of weight with the jury. 
(Br. of App. at 32). This claim might have had merit had not 
defendant made other "substantially different" statements to 
other witnesses, statements which defense counsel was fully aware 
of after discovery and before trial. Defense counsel knew from 
discovery and from the suppression hearing that defendant had 
first told the victim that he didn't know anything about the 
theft of the compressor. Then, during the first interview, he 
told Detective Hutchison that he knew something about a theft but 
not that he had committed the theft. Then he told Detective 
Christensen that he had taken the compressor and given or traded 
it to a person named Paul. Next he told the victim again, just 
before the preliminary hearing, that he had not taken the 
compressor. Finally, on April 27, he went to the Murray Police 
Station and told Detective Christensen that he hadn't taken the 
compressor but had planned the theft with Paul and had shown Paul 
where the compressor was. The victim had testified at 
preliminary hearing about the substantially different statements 
which defendant had given, so defense counsel was aware of the 
other inconsistent statements prior to trial. Thus, defendant 
has not made a credible argument that his defense was imparled by 
a "substantially different statement" which he gave. 
The second prong of the Knight analysis is a 
determination whether, without the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that there is a more favorable result for defendant. 
Here the prosecutor offered the detective's testimony of 
defendant's oral statement in his case in chief. Had defense 
counsel objected to its inclusion and the trial court suppressed 
it, there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. 
Defendant's earlier statement to the detectives that he took the 
compressor and that he acted alone while doing so was still 
admissible and was enough to convict defendant. That inculpatory 
statement, coupled with all of the other inconsistent statements 
given by defendant to different individuals at various times, are 
enough to support the conviction. Even if the April 27 oral 
statement were left out, the result of the trial would have been 
the same. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent requests that this 
Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
DATED this /V~ day of August, 1989 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-404 
plasation, was to be deemed prima facie 
evidence of guilt, jury did not determine 
if explanation was satisfactory; tbey de-
termined whether, on all evidence in the 
ease, they were convinced beyond reason-
able doubt of defendant's guilt; an expla-
nation may hove been satisfactory to jury 
gnd yet defendant found guilty because 
other evidence may have, notwithstanding, 
convinced them beyond reasonable doubt 
of his guilt; explanation may have been 
unsatisfactory, and proved, or admittedly 
false, and yet jury could acquit because 
they were not convinced beyond reason-
able doubt of defendant's guilt. 8tate v. 
Brooks, 101 U. 584, 126 P. 2d 1044. 
History: O. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by 
L. 1973, eh. 196, $ 76-6-404* 
Cross-References, 
Motor vehicles special anti-theft laws, 
41-M05 to 4M-121. 
Shoplifting Act, 78-11-14 et seq. 
Comment of defendant'! alienee. 
Where defendant charged with theft of 
building materials from construction aite 
did not testify in his own defense and 
offered no evidence to explain his late-
night presence at the site, prosecutor's 
comment that: "The defense has presented 
no evidence as to why defendant was out 
there. What was he doing out there f" was 
Theft out of atate. 
Utah court had jurisdiction to try 
defendants on charge of grand larceny 
where defendants stole car in Texas and 
drove it to Utah. Conners v. Turner, 29 U. 
(2d) 311, 508 P. 2d 1185. 
Uncorroborated explanation of possession. 
Evidence was sufficient to support con-
viction for grand larceny where recently 
stolen pistol was found in car in which 
defendant was riding and where de-
fendant's claim that he purchased pistol 
several months earlier in bar was not sup-
ported by either direct or circumstantial 
evidence. State v. Pappacostas, 17 U. (2d) 
197, 407 P. 2d 576. 
a legitimate comment on what the total 
evidence did or did not show; it was not 
impermissible comment on defendant's 
failure to testify. State v. Kazda, 540 P. 
2d 949. 
Elements of offense. 
State is not required to prove conclu-
sively who the real owner of the property 
is, but only that the defendant obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the 
propertv of another. State v. 8immons» 
573 P. *2d 341. 
Evidence establishing theft 
Evidenco which establishes the receiv-
ing of stolen property under section 70-0-
76-6-403. Theft—Evidence to support accusation.—Conduct denomi-
nated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embracing the separate 
offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, lar-
ceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiv-
ing stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence 
that it was committed in any manner specified in sections 76-6-404 through 
76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting 
a continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the de-
fense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. 
History: O. 1953, 76-6-403, enacted by Receiving stolen property. 
1*1973, ch. 196, §76-3-403; L. 1974, ch. 32, Evidence which establishes receiving 
1*7. stolen property under section 7G-6-40S is 
Compiler's Notes. sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft without the necessitv of establishing theft 
The 1974 amendment substituted "sec-
 b v taking. State v/Tnvlor, 570 P. 2d 697. 
tions 76-6-404 through 76-6-410" for "sec- • *» • 
tions 76-6-403 through 76-6-411." Collateral References, 
Single or separate larceny predicated 
npon stealing property from different own-
ers at the same time, 28 A. L. B. 2d 1182. 
76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
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AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT U 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT i n 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without 
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMEND. XII 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people. 
The first ten Amendments were proposed by the first Congress and were ratified 
as follows: New Jersey, Nov. 20, 1789; Maryland, Dec. 19, 1789; North Carolina, 
Dec. 22, 1789; 8outh Carolina, Jan. 19, 1790; New Hampshire, Jan. 25, 1790; Delaware. 
Jan. 28, 1790; Pennsylvania, Mar. 10, 1790; New York, March 27, 1790; Rhode Island, 
June 15, 1790; Vermont, Nov. 3, 1791; Virginia, Dec. 15, 1791. Connecticut, Georgia 
and Massachusetts ratified them on April 19, 1939, March 18, 1939 and March 2, 1939, 
respectively. 
AMENDMENT XI 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign State. 
History: Proposed by Congress on Sep- fied by the legislatures of three-fourths 
tember 5, 1794; declared to have been rati- of all the states on January 8, 1798. 
AMENDMENT XII 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot 
for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an 
19 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Child Sexual Abuse Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the De-
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443. fendant's Constitutional Rights?, 1986 Utah L. 
Victims Have Rights Too, 1986 Utah L. Rev. Rev. 461 
449. A.L.R. — Closed-circuit television witness 
Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an examination, 61 A.L.R.4th 1155. 
Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the de-
fense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
<4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continu-
ing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and informa-
tion may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and 
places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discov-
ery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order 
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to 
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
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(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions, 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, 
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable 
intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the 
time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the forego-
ing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall 
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consid-
eration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and 
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropri-
ate. 
(77-35-16, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Continuing duty to disclose. 
Discretion of court. 
Failure to request discovery. 
Nondisclosure. 
—No violation of rule. 
Physical evidence. 
—Stolen property. 
Required disclosure. 
—State. 
Voluntary prosecutorial response. 
Witnesses. 
Cited. 
In general 
Discovery powers are conferred upon both 
the circuit courts and the district courts. State 
v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983). 
Continuing duty to disclose. 
Even if there is no court-ordered disclosure, 
a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discov-
ered inculpatory information which falls 
within the ambit of Subdivision (a), afler the 
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of 
evidence, might so mislead a defendant as to 
cause prejudicial error. State v. Carter, 707 
P 2d 656 (Utah 1985); State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
Discretion of court 
A trial court is allowed broad discretion in 
granting or refusing discovery and inspection, 
and its determinations on this subject will not 
be overturned on appeal unless the court has 
abused its discretion. State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 
1026 (Utah 1982); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 
1187 (Utah 1984). 
Failure to request discovery. 
The defendant's claim that the prosecutor's 
failure to provide him with a police report de-
scribing a witness' testimony prior to trial was 
not entertained, no request for discovery', writ-
ten or oral, being made at any time. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). 
Nondisclosure. 
—No violation of rule. 
State's failure to disclose to defendant before 
trial certain jail records which corroborated de-
fendant's testimony that he requested medical 
treatment while in jail did not violate defen-
dant's discovery rights where there was no 
showing in record from which it could be fairly 
inferred that prosecution knew or should have 
known that defendant's request for medical 
treatment would ever be an issue or of any im-
portance at trial. State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751 
(Utah 1984). 
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cretion in refusing to allow a change of venue. 
State v. Smith, 11 Utah 2d 287, 358 P.2d 342 
(1961). 
A bare allegation of prejudice in the county 
is patently inadequate to justify a change of 
venue. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (2d case) 
(Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 
341. 74 L Ed. 2d 383 (1982). 
Defendant failed in his burden of proving 
that a fair and impartial trial could not be had 
in the county where the action was tried, and 
was therefore not entitled to a change of venue, 
where his motion for a change of venue was 
supported only by his counsels affidavit to 
which was attached a single newspaper article 
reporting the victim's father's gratitude for the 
manner in which victim's family had been 
taken care of by local authorities, and which 
reported a short and accurate account of a few 
of the basic facts of crime, including the names 
of the two persons who had been charged, such 
supporting evidence was a mere allegation of 
prejudice in the county and was not adequate 
to justify a change of venue. State v. Wood, 648 
P.2d 71 (2d case), cert denied, 459 U.S. 988, 
103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1982). 
Motion for a change of venue and the docu-
ments supporting the motion failed to show 
that the community atmosphere was suffi-
ciently inflammatory that the jurors' assur-
ances of impartiality should have been disre-
garded, even though some of the jurors had ex-
pressed an opinion that defendant was guilty 
State v Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988'. 
Defendant was not entitled to a change of 
venue where pretrial publicity and community 
sentiment was not so prejudicial as to lead in-
evitably to an unfair trial; to prevail on appeal. 
defendant must demonstrate that the trial was 
not fundamentally fair. State v. Bishop. 753 
P.2d 439 (Utah 1988' 
Factors to be considered in determining the 
potential for prejudice from pretrial publicity 
include (1) the standing of the victim and the 
accused in the community; (2> the size of the 
community; (3) the nature and gravity of the 
offense, and (4) the nature and extent of public-
ity. State v. James, 99 Utah Adv. Rep 14 
(1989). 
Disqualification of judge. 
A judge should recuse himself where there is 
a colorable claim of bias or prejudice; even un-
der such circumstances, however, absent a 
showing of actual bias or an abuse of discre-
tion, failure to recuse does not constitute re-
versible error as long as the requirements of 
this rule are met. State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 
1091 (Utah 1988) 
A judge who has had previous contact with a 
defendant on a totally unrelated matter is not 
per se disqualified. State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 
1091 (Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law § 372 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 186 to 
222. 
AJLR. — Pretrial publicity in criminal case 
as ground for change of venue, 33 A L R.3d 17. 
Change of venue by state in criminal case, 
46 A.L.R.3d 295. 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding venue and recusa-
tion matters, 7 A.L.R.4th 942. 
Disqualification of judge because of political 
association or relation to attorney in case, 65 
A.L.R.4th 73. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 115 to 
145. 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
(77-35-30, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1.) 
Cross-References. — Arraignment, neces-
sity of objection to preserve error, § 77-35-10. 
Indictments and 
errors, § 77-35-4. 
informations, harmless 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. CR-88-768 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on for hearing on July 
11, 1988, at which time testimony was received along with 
authorities relied upon by the parties, and the Court took the 
matter under advisement. The Court requested that counsel submit 
to the Court a transcript of the tape of the hearing before the 
Circuit Court, as well as the file in the case related to this 
matter. The Court has received the file, but not the transcript. 
However, based upon the files and testimony received, the Court 
can make its ruling without benefit of the transcript of the 
Circuit Court hearing. 
Defendant moves to suppress a statement he gave to the 
police concerning theft of a compressor while being interrogated 
concerning a burglary. He claims that his rights to legal 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment had been invoked, as well as 
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his rights to remain silent and to counsel under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
At the hearing, Officer Hutchison testified that he 
interviewed the defendant the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in 
Salt t a k i» r i f; y o r i A11 r I I 1, I ri r e g a r d s t o t h e b u 2: g 1 a i ; o f a 
school that had occurred the day before. Defendant was read his 
Miranda rights, and answered questions concerning the school 
were any other crimes he would like to clear up, and he stated 
that he knew who took an air compressor in an unrelated crime. 
Defendant was then booked. 
The following day, on April 7, 1988, Hutchison, with a 
Murray City Detec11 ve, aga I i i i ntei: vi ewed de f enda:nt A 3a I:i 1, 1 1 1s 
Miranda rights were read to him, and he was questioned concerning 
the theft of the ai1: compressor. Hutchison testified that the 
had been appointed for him in regards to the Edison school crime, 
but that he had not yet seen that attorney. Defendant further 
st a I v 11 "in w 1 J I 1 mi 1 j 11t 'I H N I n 111 H m (- r 11 u e s t i o n s c o n c e r r 111111 t h e 
compressor crime, and at nc time did he invoke his Miranda rights 
to remain silent or to answer no further questions without advice 
of counsel . # . ,& *- ~ * . *  « D 
time, invoked his Miranda rights, nor did ^- legal 
counsel, or to refrain from answering questions until he had 
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consulted legal counsel. In fact, he testified of his 
willingness to talk without benefit of counsel. 
Defend in in l IAVI'N tat once he had been appointed 
legal counsel, that 1 ICI rights that he could not waive in 
regards to further interrogation unless he in 11 i a t eill such 
inter r oga1101 m Defendant relies upon U.S. Ex Rel. Espinoza v. 
Fairman> 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987), and Arizona v. Roberson, 
an unpublished United States Supreme '"ourt decision, decided June 
15, 1988, 
The law stated both decisions is applicable in the 
case before t - — U.S. Ex Rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 
supra, the court stated: 
The Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment each 
provide a separate right to counsel in a criminal case. 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person. . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself. , " Although the amendment itself 
does not speak of the right to counsel, the Supreme 
Court held in Miranda v. Arizona. . . that it provides 
"an individual held for interrogation. . . the right to 
consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him 
during interrogation. . . ." In addition, the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee that M[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. , , to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 
Espinoza case, Espinoza had been arrested o in a 
------ - during interrogation of, that crime was 
questioned concerning a murder. regards to the weapons 
charge, he had invoked the right: to sell, under the Sixth 
-> 
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Amendment. No such right was, or could have been made, in 
regards to the murder charge since the State had not yet filed 
charges «^r begur to prosecute hln In thai, natter. The above 
court stated: 
Although Espinoza had no Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel in the murder case at the time of the police 
interrogation, it is clear that, as a suspect in police 
custody, he did have a Fifth Amendment right to be 
assisted by an attorney at the interrogation. However, 
Espinoza did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right at 
the interrogation. The only time at which he invoked 
his constitutional right to counsel was at his 
arraignment on the weapons charge, which occurred prior 
to the murder interrogation. We must therefore 
determine whether Espinoza1s invocation of his right to 
counsel at his arraignment constituted an invocation of 
his Fifth Amendment right. If it did, we must next 
decide whether Espinoza's Fifth Amendment invocation 
r e m a i n e d in effect at the subsequent police 
interrogation on the murder charge. If so, we must 
resolve whether Espinoza waived his Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel at the interrogation. 
We conclude that Espinoza invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel; that this invocation 
remained in effect because the custodial interrogation 
occurred while he remained in continuous police 
custody; and that because the State initiated the 
interrogation, Espinoza was incapable of waiving his 
right to counsel. We therefore conclude that the State 
violated Espinoza1s Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
and that, as a result, his confession was inadmissible. 
Tit 1 * f I mi i 1 I 1 k c w 1 Be
 (l 11 r 11 ds t hat 1 f In fart „ Christof f erson 
had invoked his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment in 
regards to the burglary of the Edison school case, in \ct , r i g h t w a s 
h i s ««1ujrii'i«i f he interrogation in this matter, not only of the 
Edison school case, but of the compressor theft case. The 
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interrogation occurred while he remained iii continuous police 
custody, the State initiated the interrogation and, therefore, 
is rlrjht- fo counsel without 
counsel being present. 
If Christofferson had not invoked his right to legal cc unsel 
under the Sixth Amendment, he still had his rights under the 
Fifth Amendment which could be waived. 
A review of £ t ate v. Christofferson, CR 88 • £»52 , t.he si:hoo 1 
burglary case, the Court file indicates that the Complaint was 
filed on April 8, 19 88, and a Summons dated that date of the 
warrant of at rest "The defendant appear ed without counsel for 
arraignment in Circuit Curt on April 1] , 1988, at: which time the 
court appointed the Legal Defenders office to represent the 
de f e nda n t A t; t o r ne y Bradshaw f i I ed his appearance on Apri 1 12 , 
1988, and the preliminary hearing held on April 13, 1988. 
There fore, the inter rogat ion by t he S a ] t I a y .e C i t .y Pc:> ] I ce, 
as wei,l a» trie Murray Poli ce, apparently occurred prior to the 
Complaint being filed, and prior to defendant's appearance in 
court without counsel, at which time legal counsel was appointed, 
This being the case, and since the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not attach until the State begins its prosecution, 
and since the case involving theft of the compressor wa,ti not 
filed until April 13, 1988, the police had a right to question 
\ 
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Christ, or fei son as long as he had been advised of his Miranda 
rights and he had effectively waived the same. 
Mr . Christofferson w a s qlve in hlii Mliaiidn right a, ami did 
waive the same, and did voluntarily talk to the police concerning 
theft of the compressor. Therefore, such statement is 
admissible. 
The defendants Motion to Suppress is, therefore, denied. 
The Court recognizes that the detective who interrogated the 
defendant t,i-»st i f leml th^f' r, April , the defendant informed him 
he had been to court and an attorney had been appointed who he 
had not yet seen. This could not have possi bl y happei \ed, since 
the court i etords Indicate clearly that neither case was filed at 
the time of or prior to April 7, and the defendant made no court 
appearance according to the files tint I,] Apr 13 ] 1 • The Coi ir t In 
tluib .lee is ion relies upon the accuracy of the official court 
files. If, in fact, the hearing had occurred prior to April 7, 
w h e t h e r or iiut. Christoffei eon Invoked hie Sixth Amendment lights 
would depend upon what was said at the hearing. If the defendant 
had stated that he did not have an attorney and requested that 
one be appointed, that would const if ut e an 1, nvorat J on of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. If the defendant made no 
request for counsel, and the Court noting he did not have one 
simply appointed the Legal Defenders Office to represent him 
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that, in this Court'• view, would not constitute an invocation of 
the Sixth Amendment rigtyt,to_ counsel. ^-—7 
Dated thi . / ay of July, 1988. 
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